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Abstract
Background: This study aims to clarify the role of FinTech digital banking start-ups
in the financial industry. We examine the impact of the funding of such start-ups on
the stock returns of 47 incumbent US retail banks for 2010 to 2016.
Methods: To capture the importance of FinTech start-ups, we use data on both the
dollar-volume of funding and number of deals. We relate these to the stock returns
with panel data regression methods.
Results: Our results indicate a positive relationship exists between the growth in
FinTech funding or deals and the contemporaneous stock returns of incumbent
retail banks.
Conclusions: Although these results suggest complementarity between FinTech and
traditional banking, we note that our results at the banking industry level are not
statistically significant, and that the coefficient signs for about one-third of the banks
are negative, but not statistically significant. Since the FinTech industry is young and
our sample period short, we cannot rule out that our findings are spurious.
Keywords: Banks, Digital banking, Finance, FinTech, Innovation, Retail banks, Start-
ups, Stock returns, Venture capital, Technology
Background
From Uber to Airbnb, disruptions have transformed many industries. Until recently,
the financial sector remained largely untouched. This changed with the breakthrough
of FinTech firms, which are “companies that use technology for banking, payments, finan-
cial data analytics, capital markets and personal financial management” (Huang, 2015). In
2015, global FinTech investment grew by 75%, exceeding the high 22 billion USD amount,
and continues to rise (Dickerson et al., 2015). This growing number threatens incumbent
retail banks as a new wave of digital banking start-ups has emerged.
Different scenarios describe FinTech’s long-term impact. The first scenario is opti-
mistic as regards the newcomers’ survival, arguing that the start-ups will gobble up key
parts of the franchise of traditional retail banks. This scenario is likely to lead to nega-
tive stock reactions for traditional US retail banks when the FinTech industry in the
US is growing. The other scenarios are more skeptical, suggesting either that the digital
banking start-ups will simply fail, or that the traditional banks are so powerful that
they will acquire the newcomers through takeovers (Sorkin, 2016). These scenarios
imply no stock reactions for traditional US retail banks when the FinTech industry in
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the US is growing. To investigate the role of digital banking start-ups in the financial
industry, our research question is as follows:
What is the impact of FinTech digital banking start-ups’ funding on the stock returns
of incumbent US retail banks?
This research specifically focuses on digital banking start-ups since they offer the
same type of services as retail banks: accepting consumer deposits, facilitating payments,
and lending money (Chishti and Barberis, 2016). Their funding serves as an indicator of
their potential values. This study uses stock returns to estimate the impact of this funding
on the performance of traditional banks. If the returns react negatively, these entrants
might disrupt the industry, while a positive effect might imply complementarity. To spe-
cify the research, we select the United States because it has the largest FinTech industry,
as well as the highest number of FinTech adopters (Ernst and Young, 2014).
Because FinTech is a recent development, very little scientific research has been con-
ducted yet. However, existing research mainly stresses start-ups’ ability to disrupt indus-
tries (Chishti and Barberis, 2016; Dickerson et al., 2015). Kauffman et al. (2015) support
this view by stating that current financial firms mainly depend on underlying technology
innovations and not on their historical market position. This consequently forces trad-
itional banks to enhance their service quality and reduce transaction costs, acting accord-
ing to strategic necessity rather than competitive advantage (Goh and Kauffman, 2013).
Jun and Yeo (2016), however, deemphasize competition and potential substitution by
stressing the complementary effect of FinTech. The contradicting views on the future of
FinTech and the largely descriptive research motivate us to reassess the role of digital
banking start-ups in the traditional banking industry using a quantitative approach.
This paper proceeds as follows. The second section reviews the conceptual and
empirical literature on disruptive innovation and FinTech-related studies. The third
section presents the data used for the analyses, followed by a methodology descrip-
tion in the fourth section. The fifth section discusses the results two subsections that
address the volume of funding and the number of deals. Finally, the final section pre-
sents the conclusion from this research as well as its limitations and future research
recommendations.
Theoretical framework
As technology evolves, products, critical success factors, and industry characteristics
change (Afuah and Utterback, 1997). This phenomenon has greatly affected the taxi
and hotel industry, in which Uber and Airbnb have largely replaced the traditional
services by offering decentralized online peer-to-peer platforms (Cannon and Sum-
mers, 2014). Since FinTech start-ups follow the same customer-centric approach by
offering alternatives such as peer-to-peer lending (Lin et al., 2015; Wang et al., 2015a, b;
Wang et al., 2015a, b; Yan et al., 2015), one might expect a shift in the banking industry as
well. Researchers apply consumer theory to examine whether digital banking start-ups in-
deed negatively affect traditional retail banks. This theory states that a new service will act
as a complement when utilized jointly with an old service and will serve as a substitute if
it can replace the old service by satisfying the same needs (Aaker and Keller, 1990;
Frank, 2009). Thus, the services digital banking start-ups offer would benefit the
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traditional retail banks in the former case and affect the incumbents’ performance in
the latter case (Kaul, 2012). It might also be possible to observe no effect when exam-
ining stock returns, which could indicate that the complementary and substitution ef-
fects offset each other. Other explanations are that the start-ups are simply too small,
our measure does not capture FinTech’s value well, or FinTech serves a new channel.
Substitution effect and disruptive innovation
FinTech start-ups offering successful substitutes for traditional services might disrupt
the retail banking industry. Christensen (1997) coined the term “disruptive innovation,”
which involves entrants that successfully target overlooked segments. In the case of
FinTech, these could be ‘unbanked’ and ‘underbanked’ segments such as small businesses
and the small dollar-loan market that do not generate enough profit for the labor in-
tensive traditional banking industry. According to this theory, start-ups eventually
displace the incumbents. FinTech companies could potentially spark such a disruptive
evolution due to their new alternatives that enhance the efficiency and quality of ser-
vices (Ferrari, 2016).
Efficiency increases are mainly due to loan personalization and the disintermediation
of processes by eliminating middlemen, which significantly lowers transaction costs for
consumers (PwC, 2016; KPMG, 2016). New technologies such as the “blockchain” also
enhance efficiency (Peters and Panayi, 2015; Wood and Buchanen, 2015). These innova-
tions will benefit FinTech firms more as banks often rely on decades-old IT infrastructure
(Laven and Bruggink, 2016). Moreover, banks are usually less likely to adopt new tech-
nologies quickly due to the regulatory environment (Hannan and McDowell, 1984).
The quality of financial services also increases as the entrants have alternative
methods to assess risk beyond the single credit score that banks examine. For instance,
companies such as Kabbage and OnDeck get their information from social-media reviews
and companies’ usage of logistics firms when assessing small business performance (The
Economist, 2015a, b). Furthermore, Avant employs advanced machine-learning algo-
rithms to underwrite consumers whose credit scores were affected by the financial crisis.
FinTech also enables a more diverse, and thus more stable, credit landscape. This is
mainly because the operations of internet-based firms are less geographically concentrated
than those of incumbent banks are (The Economist, 2015a, b). Entrants are therefore able
to attract the smaller risky enterprises that traditional retail banks would normally reject
(Dunkley, 2015). Lastly, newcomers avoid the two major risks related to banking: mis-
matched maturities and leverage. In contrast to banks, FinTech firms simply match bor-
rowers and savers directly instead of converting short-term deposits into long-term assets
(The Economist, 2015a, b).
A concrete example of a FinTech company with a potential substitution effect is
Lending Club. It is the world’s largest online marketplace connecting borrowers and in-
vestors, transforming the banking system since its establishment to make credit more
affordable and investing more rewarding. Lending Club’s similarity to traditional banks
is obvious: they both provide personal loans, business loans, and other financial services
to their customers. However, besides it low-cost operation, Lending Club has a different
business model than traditional banks do. This company, as most other FinTech firms,
focuses on its lending platform to connect borrowers and investors, meaning that
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Lending Club does not absorb the risk that borrowers will not pay back their loans.
Traditional banks need to take on these risks because they also convert short maturity
savings into long maturity loans. Furthermore, Lending Club’s major source of income
is transaction fees rather than interest income, which constitutes the key income of
traditional banks. Lastly, due to its different business model, Lending Club is less ex-
posed to regulations compared to traditional banks.
Complementary effect and collaborations
On the other hand, one might argue that FinTech firms will complement the retail
banking services. A plausible reason is that many incumbent banks have seen the sig-
nificance of FinTech and tried to incorporate these start-ups or technologies into their
businesses, either through joint partnerships, service outsourcing, venture capital fund-
ing, or acquisitions. For these banks, FinTechs seem to benefit them more than disrupt
them (PwC, 2016). Moreover, collaborations between banks and FinTech start-ups also
benefit small players. By cooperating with banks, FinTechs may get access to global
payment systems and the banks’ own customer base. This lowers the barriers of entry
for FinTech firms to the financial sector and enables them to gain more trust from
their customers (Juengerkes, 2016).
A real-world example from the FinTech industry with potential complementary effects
is Wealthfront. It is considered one of the biggest investment management platforms and
online financial advisors. Founded in 2011, Wealthfront raised $130 million, including a
$64 million round closed in October 2014. Wealthfront’s similarity to traditional banks is
that they both manage assets and investments for their customers. However, traditional
banks, such as private banks, usually serve high-net-worth individuals with high income
and sizable assets, while Wealthfront also provides investment services for less wealthy
people. Additionally, Wealthfront only charges customers assets fees, with no commission
fees. The simple and transparent pricing even enables Wealthfront to become a strong
rival of the traditional banking industry.
No impact observed
If there is no effect, then FinTechs might serve a new channel because these firms
often attract clients that traditional banking services do not normally cover. For in-
stance, risky small companies, consumers with a lacking credit history, or the small-
dollar loan market (Demos, 2016; Hayashi, 2016). FinTech companies use technology
to assess these borrowers’ creditworthiness inexpensively—an advantage over traditional
banks with many small stores in lower-income neighborhoods across the country
(Hayashi, 2016).
Of course, existing banks may also acquire FinTech companies to gain access to new
technology, which would make it more difficult to find a direct relationship between
FinTech funding and incumbent retail bank stock returns. For example, Capital One,
the tenth largest bank in the US in terms of total assets and market capitalization, ac-
quired FinTech start-up Level Money in 2015. The start-up was a San Francisco-based
digital banking technology firm, which described itself on their homepage as “the leader
in helping the next generation spend with confidence, save more and achieve financial
balance.” The company is best known for its award-winning personal finance app,
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which provides a simple solution to analyze and budget customers’ financial positions.
With more than 800,000 downloads to date, the app connects to 250 US financial insti-
tutions and specifically targets Millennials.
After its acquisition by Capital One, the FinTech firm became part of Capital One’s
Digital Innovation Team, which enables Capital One to strengthen its capabilities in
digital banking technologies. In a blog post, Level Money CEO Fuentes said the deal
helps his company continue to evolve and grow, called Capital One, “much younger
and nimbler than any other top bank,” and said it is “on a mission to transform the
way banking is done.”1
No effect could also imply that the start-ups are still too small compared to large-
established banks because these incumbents deal in trillions instead of billions. Fur-
thermore, incumbents benefit from their ability to create credit easily and from
ingrained strengths, such as their current accounts, which allow clients to securely
store their money and have permanent access to it. Since this part of finance is heavily
regulated, this sector attracts few FinTechs as competitors (The Economist, 2015a, b).
Finally, no effect could also result from the substitution and complementary effects
offsetting each other.
Hypothesis
To answer the research question, we need to test whether FinTech start-ups have a sig-
nificant effect on the retail banking industry. If this effect exists, then they should affect
the estimated stock returns of incumbent banks (Benner, 2007). Liu and Miller (2014)
and Sood and Tellis (2009) add that the prospect of disruptive pressures should depress
the stock prices of established firms. Therefore, the stock returns of incumbent retail
banks should encounter a negative effect when disruption is expected.
To examine the likelihood of innovative disruption, we require a reasonable proxy.
Prior studies show that external funding events provide a relevant and credible measure
to compare the future success of start-ups, as external financing is critical for growth
and survival (Dean and Giglierano, 1990; Davila et al., 2003; Mina et al., 2013). There-
fore, it is reasonable to assume a positive relationship between the FinTech start-up’s
value and the external funding it receives. Thus, we can use digital banking start-ups’
funding to examine the null hypothesis:
Funding in the US FinTech digital banking industry has no contemporaneous effect
on the stock returns of US incumbent banks.
We proxy funding by the volume of funding and the number of funding deals. The lat-
ter might signal additional information about the potential value of the start-ups because
a large volume of funding does not necessarily imply a large number of investors. There-
fore, we introduce the number of funding deals as another industry measurement.
In addition to our hypothesis that links FinTech funding to stock prices, it would be
interesting to investigate relationships with other metrics. For example, the relation
between FinTech funding and bank competition, bank risk-taking, and merger and
acquisition activity among incumbent retail banks. Unfortunately, we do not have rea-
sonable proxies available to statistically test such hypothesis. This would be a worth-
while endeavor for future research.
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Models of expected returns
We use a model that estimates the expected stock returns to test the hypotheses.
Many studies use Sharpe’s (1964) capital asset pricing model (CAPM). However, the
empirical implementation of this model is sufficiently poor to deny its validity (Fama
and French, 2004).
To better explain the average returns on stocks and bonds, Fama and French (1993) ex-
tended the CAPM model to use three factors for the stock market: an overall market factor
capturing the excess return of the market portfolio, a factor related to firm size, and a fac-
tor for book-to-market equity values, leading to the following model2 (Davis et al., 2000):
EðRiÞ − Rf ¼ bi½EðRmÞ − Rf  þ siEðSMBÞ þ hiEðHMLÞ:
Here, Ri is the return on asset i, Rf is the risk-free interest rate, and RM is the return
on the value-weighted market portfolio.
SMB is the equal-weighted averages of the returns on the three small stock portfolios
minus the three big stock portfolios. Similarly, HML is the average return on a portfolio
of high book-to-market equity stocks minus the average return on a portfolio of low
book-to-market equity stocks, constructed to be neutral with respect to size. Despite its
high empirical validity in asset pricing, the three-factor model still has a theoretical
shortcoming. The SMB and HML explanatory returns are not variables that capture in-
vestors’ concerns, but are “brute force constructs” instead (Fama and French, 2004).
Furthermore, both the three-factor model and the CAPM suffer from the momentum
effect, indicating that stocks that do well tend to continue to do well and vice versa
(Jegadeesh and Titman, 1993).
As an extension of the three-factor model, Fama and French (2015) introduced a
five-factor model, adding profitability and investment factors:
EðRiÞ − Rf ¼ biRMRF þ siEðSMBÞ þ hiEðHMLÞ þ riEðRMW Þ
þ ciEðCMAÞ:
Here, Ri is the return on asset i, Rf is the risk-free interest rate, and RMRF is the ex-
cess return on the value-weight market portfolio.
RMW is the average return on the two robust operating profitability portfolios
minus the average return on the two weak operating profitability portfolios. RMW is
the average return on the two conservative investment portfolios minus the average
return on the two aggressive investment portfolios. This study uses both the Fama-
French three-factor model and five-factor model to capture the expected stock
returns of the incumbent retail banks. Note that there is no general agreement on
which asset pricing model best describes the cross-section of stock returns. By inclu-
ding both models, we partially address the robustness of our results for different spe-
cifications of the asset pricing model.
Data
This study used data from the venture finance-data firm CB Insights to identify US
digital banking start-ups closely related to retail banks. CB Insights gathers data
from different sources, such as regulatory filings (such as Form D), investor websites,
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company websites, and (social) media. In addition, some investors post data directly
to CB Insights.3 Our analysis depends on public disclosure of FinTech deals to be
captured in the CB Insights database. Note that it would also be difficult for inves-
tors in incumbent banks to change their view on the share price if FinTech deals
remain private.
To retrieve the sample, we first applied several filters to companies that engage in
FinTech activities and are closely related to retail banks. The main industries we selected
included “Internet,” “Mobile and Telecommunications,” and “Financial,” and refined them
by selecting industries and subindustries. For “Internet,” we filtered firms for “Internet
Software and Services” with “Accounting and Finance” as the subindustry. For “Mobile
and Telecommunications,” we selected the “Mobile Software and Services” industry, with
“Accounting and Finance” as the subindustry. Lastly, for “Financial,” we applied
“Asset/Financial Management,” “Lending,” “Payments,” and “Retail Banking” as filters.
This gave us a sample of 558 firms, which we narrowed down to 522 companies by
excluding InsurTech. The selected FinTech start-ups are located in the US and re-
ceived investments from January 2010 to March 2016. We chose this period because
most FinTech firms began operating from 2010. CB Insights also provides the volume
of funding4 committed to these start-ups and the number of deals since January 2010.
Unfortunately, the start of FinTech coincides with the establishment of the Dodd-Frank
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act that was signed into federal law on 21
July 2010. The major restructuring of financial regulation may have affected the share
prices of traditional banks immediately at its introduction, in which case the effect on our
results would be limited. However, a prolonged period in which investors needed to in-
corporate the new federal law fully into banks’ share prices may influence our empirical
results. However, it is not immediately clear how this would affect the month-to-month
correlations of FinTech deals and bank prices.
The question may arise as to whether FinTech companies fall under similar regu-
lations as traditional banks. On this point, regulators are somewhat ambivalent. On
the one hand, they want to encourage innovation in the banking sector by lowering
regulatory costs for start-ups. On the other hand, they are aware that for similar
services, such as lending, they should have similar regulations in place to protect
consumers and to create a level playing field with traditional banks.5 However, fi-
nancial regulators are still deciding whether to introduce new and stricter regula-
tion for FinTech companies, potentially weakening their threat to incumbent
banks.6 Buchack et al. (2017) suggest that FinTech companies may be involved in
regulatory arbitrage. Regulators may want to prevent this from keeping a grip on
the financial system.
As Fig. 1 shows, funding volume is volatile month to month. We used the standard-
ized values of the group mean and standard deviation. We also transformed the abso-
lute amounts of funding into growth rates. The natural logarithm difference between
month t and month t − 1 is a proxy for the growth rate of month t. We applied these
transformations to the number of deals. Table 1 presents all transformations, and we
show our raw data in Appendix Table 4 for reference. We also show the results for a
subsample of only “Consumer FinTech” in Panel B, but we see that this subsample is
rather small and is therefore less likely to fully capture the impact of FinTech on the
retail banking industry.
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We retrieved a list of 138 US retail banks from Credio.com, a finance website that
compares US financial services.7 We used the Bloomberg database to obtain banks’
monthly total return indices. The total return index (TRI) is the dividend-adjusted
stock price that measures both the capital gains and dividend distributions, assuming
that dividends are reinvested in the same stock. We present the development of the
total return indices of the financial sector and US market in Fig. 2.8
Of the 138 retail banks, we have total returns available for 47 banks. The excluded
banks are often regional banks. We do not include non-listed banks because they
would have only annual accounting returns such as Return-on-Equity (ROE) or
Return-on-Assets (ROA) available. With annual data, it would be challenging to separ-
ate market-wide effects from the effects of FinTech funding. Hence, we include listed
firms with monthly data to which we can link monthly FinTech funding data. Using
performance information from non-listed banks could be a valuable extension for fu-
ture research.
Since we do not have data available for the regional operations of traditional banks or
FinTech companies, we cannot provide a more in-depth analysis of which FinTech deal
flow affects which bank. This may be a fruitful area of further research. Note that the
information we do have about the location of the headquarters may not be that helpful
in this regard, as traditional banks have local offices to service clients. Moreover, the
FinTech industry seems to be heavily concentrated in either the technology center in
California, particularly Silicon Valley, or the financial center around New York, with
the US industry concentrated in these locations with about 74,000 and 57,000 people
employed in each location respectively (Ernst and Young, 2015). Accenture confirms
that New York and Silicon Valley attract the most capital for the FinTech industry
(Dickerson et al., 2015). Since FinTechs operate mainly digitally, office locations seem
Fig. 1 Evolution of FinTech dollar-volume funding and number of FinTech deals
Table 1 Data transformation
Original variable Transformed variable Formula
FinTech funding volume Standardized FinTech funding volume zt ¼ xt − xs ; t ¼ 1; 2;…; n
FinTech volume growth rate gt = ln xt − ln xt − 1, t = 2, 3,…, n
FinTech number of deals Standardized FinTech number of deals zt ¼ xt − xs ; t ¼ 1; 2;…; n
FinTech number of deals growth rate gt = ln xt − ln xt − 1, t = 2, 3,…, n
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to be even less meaningful when trying to examine geographical relationships. How-
ever, since this study concentrates on the industry level, the sample is still representa-
tive and the aggregation of the 47 selected banks will nevertheless serve as a reasonable
sample for the retail banking industry. Using banks’ TRI, we calculate the stock return
for month t as follows:
Rt ¼ TRIt−TRIt−1TRIt−1 ; t ¼ 2; 3;…; n
To apply the Fama-French models, we retrieved the historical monthly values of the
factors in Table 2 from Kenneth French’s web page9 for January 2010 till March 2016.
Methods
We assume that the normal return for each incumbent retail bank is well-proxied by
either the three-factor model (Fama and French, 1993) or the five-factor model (Fama
Fig. 2 Total return indexes of the US stock market and the US financial sector
Table 2 List of Fama-French factors
Variable Explanation
RMRF The excess return of the market portfolio
SMB The average returns on the small stock portfolios minus the average returns on the big stock
portfolios (Small Minus Big)
HML The average returns on the high book-to-market ratio portfolios minus the average returns
on the low book-to-market portfolios (High Minus Low)
RMW The average returns on the robust operating profitability portfolios minus the average returns
on the weak operating profitability portfolios (Robust Minus Weak)
CMA The average returns on the conservative investment portfolios minus the average returns on
the aggressive investment portfolios (Conservative Minus Aggressive)
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and French, 2015). We then add the FinTech variable to see whether it has an effect on
the stock price above and beyond these three- or five-factor models. The resulting re-
gression equation is:
Ri;t − Rf ;t ¼ ai þ βiRMRFt þ siSMBt þ hiHMLt þ riRMWt
þ ciCMAt þ γ iFinTecht þ εi;t ;
where RMRF is the excess return of the equity market relative to the risk-free rate,
SMB is the return of small minus large capitalization stocks, HML is the return of high
minus low book-to-market stocks, RMW is the return of robust minus weak profitabil-
ity stocks, and CMA is the return of conservative minus aggressive investing stocks.
The three-factor model does not include the RMW and CMA factors. Depending on
our model, FinTecht represents the standardized FinTech funding volume and the
funding volume growth rate, or the number of FinTech deals and the growth in the
number of deals.
Since we have a panel data structure, we must determine how to model each param-
eter. We consider three model specifications: (a) pooled, (b) fixed effects, and (c) free.
In the pooled model, we assume that each estimated coefficient is the same for each
bank. In the fixed effects model, we assume bank-specific alphas, but keep the other pa-
rameters the same for each bank. In the free model, each parameter is bank-specific,
except for the FinTech coefficient. We test the -coefficient for statistical significance
for each model specification. In addition, we also include the results of a single regres-
sion equation on the banking industry returns, in which we do not use information at
the individual bank level.
In the Appendix, we also report the results of a Seemingly Unrelated Regression
specification, in which we also allow a bank-specific parameter γ. By studying the γ-
coefficients on an individual level, we can analyze which banks seemed to be more
affected by FinTech.
Results
We start this section with the analysis of the impact of the dollar-volume of FinTech
funding on incumbent banks’ stock returns. We then test the number of deals instead
of the dollar-volume. Both measures could be relevant to measure the importance of
FinTech in the US retail banking market. Table 3 contains our regression results.
First, we see that the parameter estimates for the three panel data models and the
industry-level regression leads to similar parameter estimates. The three panel data
models have higher associated t-values than at the industry-level. This is due to the
cross-sectional information used in the panel data setup, while at the industry-level we
have only time-series variation.
Based on the panel data models, we see that the funding volume itself is not statisti-
cally significant, with t-statistics ranging from 0.03 to 0.98, depending on the panel data
model and whether we use the three- or five-factor model as a benchmark. The num-
ber of deals is marginally significant, with t-statistics varying between 1.86 and 2.00 for
the different panel data models. The results for the growth rates are much stronger; the
t-statistics for the panel data models are well above 2.5 for each, indicating statistical
significance. Since the coefficients are all positive, this implies that stock returns of in-
cumbent retail banks are higher in periods with increasing FinTech funding or number
Li et al. Financial Innovation  (2017) 3:26 Page 10 of 16
of deals. Hence, we do not find evidence of creative destruction, but rather that the Fin-
Tech industry has a positive spill-over to the traditional retail banking industry.
We show the results of the Seemingly Unrelated Regressions for the growth in Fin-
Tech funding in the Appendix in Table 5. These bank-specific estimates of the gamma
parameter show that the positive coefficient above is an average across banks and that
16 of 47 banks have negative estimates, although none are statistically significant. Our
results are not statistically significant for the level of funding, have different signs
across banks, and are not statistically significant at the industry-level, suggesting that
our finding of complementarity is fragile.
Discussion and conclusion
This paper aims to provide a new perspective on the debate about the impact of US
digital banking start-ups on the performance of US retail banks by using quantitative
analysis. Based on our empirical results, we reject both null hypotheses incorporating
the effect of the growth of the volume of funding and the change in the number of
deals, as all coefficients from our panel data models are positive and statistically signifi-
cant. Therefore, we conclude that although the large sum of investments raised public
awareness, the funding of digital banking start-ups is more likely to have a positive ef-
fect on the incumbents’ stock returns than a negative effect. This suggests complemen-
tarity between FinTech and traditional banking, rather than substitution and disruptive
innovation. However, our results are weaker for the level of funding, or if we investigate
the banking industry returns.
Although we find positive and statistically significant results, we cannot rule out that
our findings are spurious and alternative scenarios are also at play. First, while the
FinTech start-ups are growing rapidly, they may still be too small to affect incumbent
US retail banks. Within a period of less than five years, it is difficult for consumers to
adapt to the new changes newcomers brought or to trust in their online and automatic
services. Additionally, retail banks benefit from their ingrained advantages, such as their
ability to create credit instantly. Second, the substitute and complementary effects may
partly offset each other. On the one hand, successful FinTech firms may have weakened
the banks’ dominant position by improving the quality and efficiency of traditional ser-
vices; on the other hand, banks have taken actions to respond to these challenges, possibly
by acquiring FinTech start-ups or setting up their own FinTech affiliates. Third, FinTechs
Table 3 Empirical results
Funding volume Growth volume Number of deals Growth deals
Full sample 3 factor 5 factor 3 factor 5 factor 3 factor 5 factor 3 factor 5 factor
Pooled Estimate 0.08 0.00 0.11 0.12 0.18 0.18 0.35 0.39
T-value 0.82 0.03 2.64 2.87 1.90 1.89 3.00 3.29
Fixed effects Estimate 0.08 0.00 0.12 0.13 0.18 0.18 0.36 0.39
T-value 0.80 0.04 2.70 2.92 1.86 1.86 3.03 3.31
Free Estimate 0.09 0.01 0.12 0.13 0.18 0.19 0.37 0.39
T-value 0.98 0.07 3.04 3.24 2.00 2.08 3.35 3.56
Industry Estimate 0.08 0.01 0.12 0.13 0.19 0.19 0.36 0.40
T-value 0.31 0.02 1.02 1.13 0.72 0.74 1.15 1.29
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could have established a new channel to distribute financial services, as start-ups and in-
cumbents might have different customer bases. If this is the case, direct competition may
remain low, which makes it difficult to observe a clear relationship.
This study has several limitations. First, we used FinTech funding as a proxy for the
potential value of the FinTech start-ups because no other data are available. Although
we believe that we made reasonable assumptions, we cannot avoid the potentially nega-
tive impact of this proxy on the empirical analyses. It would also be interesting to in-
vestigate the effect on bank risk taking or competition within the industry, but we lack
the necessary data for such a study. Second, the sample might be too small to draw
conclusions for the time-series regressions due to the sample period of January 2010
until March 2016, which is rather short. However, these are the only data available. We
also could not examine the geographical areas in which FinTech firms and traditional
retail banks operate in more detail. Having data available in this area could lead to
stronger claims on the causality between FinTech flows and retail bank performance.
Similarly, we searched for information to differentiate the reaction of incumbent banks
to FinTech developments. Whether banks ignore FinTech, fund their own start-ups, or
cooperate with external FinTech firms should affect their stock prices. However, we
could not find enough information on the incumbent banks to analyze, such a differen-
tiated view. Another limitation might be that we use monthly data. Since technological
innovations follow investments in FinTech firms, there may be a delayed reaction at
the moment of the discovery of the innovation rather than at its initial financing. Here,
we had to compromise between the frequency of our analysis and the length or our
sample period. Using a quarterly frequency would decrease the number of observations
and thus limit statistical inference, by definition. Third, as we discussed in the theoret-
ical framework section, the Fama-French three-factor model suffers from shortcomings;
for example, it ignores the momentum effect. Although the Fama-French model was
improved by introducing two extra factors to create the five-factor model, the momen-
tum effect and the low volatility factor are still of concern (Blitz et al., 2016).
Future research could undertake an extended cross-sectional analysis of the effect of
start-ups by studying different countries, because other countries may have a different
structure in the retail banking industry and impact outside the US. It would also be
worthwhile to expand our sample of listed banks to include non-listed banks, although
these studies would have to measure performance through low frequency accounting
measures instead. Moreover, examining the effect of different investment stages on the in-
cumbents’ stock returns might provide more insight in the fast-growing FinTech industry.
Endnotes
1Quotes from the following blog post: http://blog.levelmoney.com/post/
107894276051/the-next-level
2Davis, Fama, and French (2000) form six value-weighted portfolios, S/L, S/M, S/H,
B/L, B/M, and B/H, as intersections of the size and book-to-market equity (B/M)
groups. For example, S/L is the value-weighted return on the portfolio of stocks below
the NYSE median in size and in the bottom 30% of B/M.
3See https://www.cbinsights.com/blog/private-company-financing-data-sources-
cruncher/ for more information on the data collection process employed by CB
Insights.
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4Funding data obtained from CB Insights includes all types of financing available,
such as venture capital, angel funding, IPOs, and private equity investments.
5See Deloitte, “The evolving Fintech regulatory environment,” https://www2.deloitte.-
com/us/en/pages/regulatory/articles/fintech-risk-management.html
6See Reuters, “Fintech challenges for regulators: Evolution or revolution,” http://
www.reuters.com/article/bcfinreg-fintech-regulation/fintech-challenge-for-regulators-
evolution-or-revolution-idUSKBN17N1SI
7http://www.credio.com
8For comparison, we adjust the S&P Composite 1500 Financials (Sector) Total Return
to start from the same level as the S&P US Composite 1500 Index Total Return.
9http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html
Appendix
Table 4 Raw data on FinTech funding and number of deals
Panel A: Entire sample
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Fund Deal Fund Deal Fund Deal Fund Deal Fund Deal Fund Deal Fund Deal
January 26.6 6 27.0 8 106.8 7 72.7 17 22.2 9 91.5 12 174.1 22
February 2.3 2 18.2 6 1.2 1 84.5 9 116.0 16 148.2 16 73.8 16
March 270.7 7 44.9 11 19.9 3 29.2 7 250.0 16 184.8 13 245.3 20
April 57.6 8 1.6 2 17.5 9 340.2 5 520.6 21 1353.8 17
May 5.3 4 69.4 12 27.2 4 184.8 12 141.9 6 358.2 20
June 40.8 5 118.8 11 54.5 8 81.5 8 3575.2 10 363.3 13
July 264.1 9 44.3 4 22.4 4 96.7 18 693.6 21 525.8 22
August 0.5 2 82.2 10 141.2 10 44.5 11 237.0 6 467.2 8
September 147.9 10 107.0 10 73.3 7 250.2 12 109.7 9 547.4 22
October 232.8 4 30.5 2 57.1 7 371.7 11 126.7 19 3905.9 25
November 29.9 6 0.0 1 2.9 2 79.0 8 142.6 10 355.2 14
December 347.9 9 20.2 6 55.5 6 24.2 7 1989.1 19 33.6 10
Panel B: Subsample with only “Consumer FinTech”
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Fund Deal Fund Deal Fund Deal Fund Deal Fund Deal Fund Deal Fund Deal
January 0.0 0 0.0 0 20.4 2 33.6 5 12.2 1 24.1 5 68.7 8
February 2.0 1 4.5 2 0.0 0 3.1 2 20.3 4 104.6 5 16.4 4
March 6.9 2 6.2 1 0.0 0 5.0 1 90.4 3 0.7 1 38.2 5
April 45.4 4 0.0 0 0.0 1 30.0 1 147.3 5 263.6 7
May 0.0 0 15.7 2 0.1 1 162.0 6 91.8 4 209.4 11
June 38.0 2 31.2 2 29.5 3 40.1 3 3.1 3 183.8 4
July 0.0 0 5.0 1 20.8 1 18.6 4 671.0 12 266.7 4
August 0.0 0 50.0 3 4.5 4 25.1 4 206.5 2 409.1 4
September 2.9 1 29.0 2 0.0 0 95.9 4 81.1 3 376.7 11
October 1.3 2 30.0 1 1.5 1 17.7 6 69.7 5 237.3 10
November 16.0 1 0.0 0 0.0 0 57.0 1 2.5 1 331.3 9
December 0.0 0 0.0 0 1.9 2 7.0 1 1411.2 9 18.4 3
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Table 5 OLS Regression Results of Models with FinTech Volume Growth
Ticker Name alpha RMRF SMB HML FINTECH
– Entire banking industry −0.10 0.90 * 0.61 * 0.46 0.12
BAC Bank of America Corp −1.03 1.36 * 0.48 0.81 0.45
BBT BB&T Corp −0.41 0.94 * 0.50 0.23 0.21
BK Bank of New York Mellon Corp −0.61 1.27 * −0.09 0.75 0.09
BOKF BOK Financial Corp −0.16 0.72 * 0.61 * 0.50 0.11
BXS BancorpSouth Inc −0.50 0.89 * 1.07 * 0.69 * 0.70
C Citigroup Inc −1.10 1.70 * 0.09 0.60 0.08
CARE Carter Bank & Trust 1.12 0.27 0.37 0.35 −0.22
CBF Capital Bank Financial Corp 1.27 0.20 0.66 −0.34 0.79
CFG Citizens Financial Group Inc −0.39 1.32 * 0.54 0.48 −1.23
CMA Comerica Inc −0.70 1.17 * 0.61 * 0.78 −0.03
COF Capital One Financial Corp 0.00 1.11 * 0.27 0.57 −0.14
EWBC East West Bancorp Inc −0.12 1.31 * 1.00 * 0.14 −0.33
FFIN First Financial Bankshares Inc 0.14 0.91 * 1.15 * 0.31 −0.22
FITB Fifth Third Bancorp −0.46 1.21 * 0.41 0.44 0.28
FRC First Republic Bank/CA 0.69 1.00 * 0.48 0.12 0.43
HSBC HSBC Holdings PLC −1.38 * 1.15 * −0.50 0.22 −0.26
IBKC IBERIABANK Corp −0.38 0.76 * 1.05 * 0.74 0.15
IBTX Independent Bank Group Inc −0.31 1.16 * 1.54 * 0.20 0.81
JPM JPMorgan Chase & Co 0.37 −1.42 * 0.06 −0.60 −0.31
MTB M&T Bank Corp 0.34 0.59 * 0.26 0.52 −0.05
NTRS Northern Trust Corp −0.58 1.00 * 0.19 0.31 −0.07
NWBI Northwest Bancshares Inc 0.27 0.46 * 0.38 0.48 0.18
OZRK Bank of the Ozarks Inc 1.75 * 0.96 * 0.84 * 0.34 −0.11
PB Prosperity Bancshares Inc −0.51 1.03 * 1.12 * 0.35 0.05
PBCT People’s United Financial Inc −0.31 0.72 * 0.28 0.22 0.02
PNBI Pioneer Bankshares Inc 0.78 0.26 −0.01 0.40 −0.01
PNC PNC Financial Services Group Inc 0.01 0.81 * 0.52 0.32 0.33
PRK Park National Corp 0.65 0.55 * 1.13 * 0.17 0.33
SNV Synovus Financial Corp −0.78 1.81 * 0.70 * 0.28 −0.17
STI SunTrust Banks Inc −0.56 1.38 * 0.41 0.50 0.33
SUSQ Susquehanna Bancshares Inc −0.52 1.57 * 0.35 0.26 −0.16
SYBJF Security Bank Corp 3.83 * 0.06 1.64 * 1.03 0.04
TCB TCF Financial Corp −0.84 0.94 * 0.82 * 0.60 0.11
TD Toronto-Dominion Bank 0.00 0.93 * −0.17 0.62 0.44
TRMK Trustmark Corp −1.09 1.15 * 0.30 0.23 0.50
TRST TrustCo Bank Corp NY −0.06 0.67 * 1.05 * 0.76 0.01
UBSH Union Bankshares Corp 0.24 1.06 * 0.82 * 0.37 0.29
UCBI United Community Banks Inc./GA 0.39 0.34 * 1.71 * 1.36 0.32
UMBF UMB Financial Corp −0.07 0.75 * 1.16 * 0.26 0.43
UMPQ Umpqua Holdings Corp −0.26 1.08 * 1.38 * 0.55 −0.11
USB US Bancorp 0.01 0.83 * 0.06 0.11 0.27
VLY Valley National Bancorp −0.47 0.75 * 0.77 * 0.50 0.07
WAFD Washington Federal Inc −0.35 0.94 * 0.70 * 0.64 * 0.63
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